Context

Building on the findings of the Kagame report (see introductory summary), a series of institutional reforms have been underway at the African Union (AU), all seeking to raise the effectiveness of the continental body, but also the levels of ownership by its states.

The internal reform agenda relates to the way the African Union Commission (AUC) is itself staffed and organised – including the AUC electoral procedures and a restructuring of the organisation that saw the political affairs and peace and security departments merge. Externally-focused reforms relate to one of the goals of the AU: to provide a common platform and representational voice for African states on the world stage. This has led to a new partnership strategy that seeks to address the weaknesses of the past, including the AU’s representational role, and to discussions of how, if at all, the UN might be reformed to better reflect African concerns and priorities.

As our different analyses underline, each of these different areas has also come up against the difficulty of convening states around a common agenda, when national interests can sometimes be perceived to be better served by operating unilaterally.

If this new economic model was an ambition at the outset, its resonance has increased with the COVID-19 pandemic and the conviction that “increased intra-African trade is what will drive economic development post-COVID-19” (Mene, 2021). Though the pandemic is a major economic threat, combined with the political backing for the AfCFTA, it may offer a critical juncture for pushing policymakers to address long-standing trade and economic reforms.

Inside the AU - revising the AUC elections process

One of the issues cited by the Kagame report was the lack of transparency around AUC appointments, and the representation of women and regions. In response his proposals included making recruitment of the Deputy Chairperson and Commissioners more competitive, taking account of gender and regional diversity, and reviewing the structure and staffing needs of the AUC. This was intended to help improve the sense of ownership of member states and thus help make the AU more effective and responsive to its member states. But as with all policy reforms, it runs the risk of altering formal structures with limited impact on actual functions – the topic of this analysis.

A process was put in place to improve the AUC elections taking place in early 2021, with new rules requiring the top AU leadership to display gender parity, requiring that if the AUC Chairperson is a man, his Deputy should be a woman – and vice-versa. Most of the candidates for the role of Deputy AU commissioner were women (five out of eight), partly due to implicit agreement that the previous Commissioner Faki would continue.

Even though those rules arguably complicated the selection process - given a more limited pool of female candidates overall, by process of elimination, once some posts were filled, candidates for others were no longer legitimate due to their region or gender - they were nonetheless followed.

In broad terms, ‘formal institutions’ won over background, informal ‘deals’. This is likely the case precisely because the rules, particularly on regional representation were in the interests of member states, given regional relations built up over time between leaders engaging through the RECs, and historical solidarity. By sticking to its own rigid rules, the AU has shown it can go beyond intentions, thus helping to improve the chances of greater ownership by member states given regional representation in this area and providing a precedent for reforms in other areas.

Inside the AU – merging peace and governance

Part of the AUC reform process has centred on prioritising themes and rationalising bureaucratic structures. One key reform here was to merge the AU’s peace and security department with that of political affairs, effectively merging the continental peace and governance agendas.

Though there is a logic for better connecting the two areas of work – instability is often a result of flawed election processes or political and constitutional crises – the implications of the merger must also be understood in terms of interests and incentives. Given the AU’s challenges in enforcing the governance agenda and some of the underlying principles, the merger raised questions about whether the merger would bolster the governance agenda, sideline it, or indeed simply reflect a superficial shuffling of the cards with little real impact. These suggest three possible outcomes: magnification, marginalisation, or ‘more of the same’.

Arguing that a stronger governance agenda through magnification is desirable, the paper analyses how different drivers of the security-governance merger – such as institutional complexity, ambivalent conceptions of ‘governance’, a clash between non-indifference and sovereignty, AU leadership and international partners – jointly led to a situation where the governance agenda got little traction compared to the AU’s peace and security activities. It concludes that since the drivers of these dynamics are political, institutional changes made to the AUC may be useful but not sufficient for real change.

The analysis suggests that success from a ‘governance’ perspective would depend on political buy-in from member states as much as it does on fine-tuning institutional arrangements to: leave space for AU leadership to take hold, prevent new governance-security silos emerging, and rapidly deliver a few quick wins through election observation, mediation and early warning.

Separately, stakeholders could help enhance political traction by establishing a new governance narrative that factors in member states’ concerns and interests in seeing an African governance agenda that combines socio-economic and (not only) political benchmarks. Finally, the magnification of governance requires the AUC’s proactive engagement with member states, fine-tuned external funding to support PAPS without constraints, and substantive partnerships with African civil society organisations that enhance the department’s operational capacity.

The AU looking out – seeking a continental partnership strategy

Beyond its internal reforms and institutional structures, the African Union is mandated to promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent. One of the AU’s key objectives is to encourage international cooperation with external partners to meet its Agenda 2063 vision of Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner.

Exploring that agenda, and how member state interests play out, this paper discusses the AU’s Partnerships Strategy and Policy Framework which is being developed as part of its ongoing reform process. The objective of the strategy is to reformulate how the AU engages with external partners – again with a view to improving member state ownership and the AU’s agency and autonomy.

The AU has a number of partnerships with countries, regional organisations and international institutions, but within the AU there is a growing realisation that past approaches to partnerships are no longer fit for purpose, often reflecting a donor-recipient relationship rather than the oft-cited ‘partnership’ that is sought. But the relationship between the AU and its member states has often made it difficult to define priorities when engaging with partners, while external partners often perceive Africa as a passive player at the crossroads of global power – these have undermined past attempts to arrive at a common strategy towards external partners.

With the rise in partnerships, since the 2000s in particular, there has been an accelerating frequency of Africa summits and partnership meetings with third countries and regions. These include strategic partners with established summit frameworks such as the EU, China, Japan, India, Korea, Turkey and the Arab League, but also through summits with other countries like Russia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States once in 2014 under the Obama administration, with another planned under the Biden administration next year. With 55 AU countries, this can lead to a mass mobilisation of African leaders, and place a high burden on the diplomatic services of AU member states, at times with unclear direct benefits for the participating countries.

The full array of actors involved in AU partnerships is summarised below:

The AU Assembly in 2006 adopted a decision on bilateral summits between African countries and an individual external partner country, colloquially known as the ‘Banjul Formula’, to try and ensure effective representation and bargaining in such summits. But Member states also raised concerns about the formula’s effectiveness. Some AU member states voiced concerns that the Banjul Formula didn’t allow for adequate representation of all member states given the absence of adequate rotation in representing Africa vis-a-vis the partner. Given the above challenges, the 2017 Kagame Report recommended that Summits convened by external parties be reviewed with a view to providing an effective framework for AU partnerships. However, continuing concerns meant that the AU Assembly at its 2020 Summit finally decided upon representation aspects – shown below.​​ This new format is arguably a mere revitalisation of that old format of representation, with representation by a select group of leaders on behalf of all AU member states.

This synthesis note was created by Bruce Byiers and Isabell Wutz building on the work and inputs of Philomena Apiko, Amanda Bisong, Bruce Byiers, Alfonso Medinilla, Martin Ronceray, Lidet Tadesse and Ueli Staeger (external). For information about this guide and to know more about ECDPM’s work on African institutions and regional dynamics, and on the PEDRO II project, please contact Bruce Byiers at bby@ecdpm.org.