The process of normalisation that brought Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain together may also indicate that the wider Western Asia region is passing through a period defined by shifting dynamics. Over the past few years, the United States’ (US) retrenchment opened space for new alliances while, at the same time, the enduring regional competition continues to erode the few regional institutions that tried to stymy stabilisation, notably the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Local competition (re: between Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Iran etc) continues to mar cooperation and a number of hybrid and proxy wars continue unabated. But is it possible to think about a future Grand Bargain to establish a West Asia Union? Can the European Union — also a product of enduring rivalries and war — act as a beacon for such a union or does this all remain a utopian dream?
This work unpacks regional dynamics and seeks to determine whether the forces of competition will trump; bringing the various actors into an escalation spiral or whether the interests embedded in regional cooperation will generate new accords and greater unity among the main protagonists.
Geographically, West Asia extends from Turkey to Yemen and includes Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, the Arab Gulf monarchies and the Sinai Peninsula (some scholars also include Iran) and is the bridge between three continents—Africa, Asia and Europe. It is also one of the crucial regions Nicholas Spykman termed the ‘Rimland;’ the lands peripheral to the Eurasian continent and the real strategic centre of the world. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, West Asia’s stability folded into a series of nationalist movements which, given the cli-mate of the Cold War, gravitated into either Western (re: the US and its NATO allies) or Eastern (re: the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies) camps. With few exceptions (notably the string of Arab-Israeli wars) the process of state building and power consolidation dominated the regional agenda and prevented, largely, sustained adventurism. This has drastically changed since 1979 which marked the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the consolidation of power by Ba’athist Saddam Hussein in Iraq and, importantly, the formal disengagement of Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Camp David Accords. As such, the subsequent decades saw the dissipation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the rise in Arab-Arab and Arab-Iranian tensions.
At present, the region is in turmoil. The end of the Cold War further reduced international polarisation and this reduced state-centred economic stability (the USSR’s demise stripped many of the Arab states of their cash-flows) and led to crises of legitimacy. This, in turn, has bred sectarianism, nationalism and Islamism resulting in a surge of religious terrorism (re: Al Qaeda, Daesh, Hezbollah). Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, Washington began a string of military interventions which caused further tensions in the region and, to an extent, contributed to the so-called Arab Spring movements. Indeed, the Arab Spring has been likened to the beginning of a West Asia ‘Thirty Years’ War,’ which gave birth to the modern nation state in Europe. Or, as others argue, the post-Cold War architecture in West Asia resembles 19th century Europe: sprinkled with middle powers vying for spheres of influence.
In terms of security dynamics, a Cold War between Iran and Saudi Arabia (and their allies) fuels the region with instability. The 1979 Islamic Revolution, coupled with the subsequent seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by a millenarian group of al-Ikhwan (led by Juhayman al-Otaybi), is indicative of this trend. Indeed, while the region continues to grapple with a resurgent Iran, it has also had to contend with a spate of Sunni revisionism as reflected in Ikhwani groups. This already volatile situation has been rendered more fragile with the recent rearrival of Turkey into the geopolitical mix. Ankara is now directly competing for influence in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. For West Asian integration to work a complex security system must be implemented that includes: Israel, Turkey, Iran and all the Arab states from Morocco to Iraq. No state can be excluded. At the same time, a general reconciliation within the Muslim majority states of West Asia needs to take place as the main fault line runs through two diametrically opposed visions. The first bloc regards political Islam (Sunni and Shia) as the kernel of legitimacy. This bloc tends to seek to revise the regional status quo to carve out new spheres of influence. Turkey, Iran and Qatar belong in this first bloc. The second bloc works at maintaining the status quo and views political Islam and, in particular, the Muslim Brotherhood as a challenge both domestically and regionally. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and most other Sunni states in the Arab world belong to this bloc.
The Israel factor is also important to consider when discussing the potential for a Grand Bargain in West Asia—it is the only non-Muslim majority country in the region and it lacks the cultural overlaps that may be needed to assuage tensions. However, even in this case, the stra-tegic benefits of including Israel outweighs the cultural costs of integration. Whether reflecting on the 1979 peace with Egypt, with Jordan in 1994, the sputtering (nearly failed) Oslo I and II peace process with the Palestinians or the recent peace with the UAE, Bahrain and now Sudan it is clear that Israel is key for long-term stabilisation in the region. Palestine must not be forgotten in this process or stabilisation will likely be short-lived.
A quadruple Grand Bargain is needed to spearhead regional integration and to incentivise others to seek economic development and social stability rather than perpetual competition for elusive goals. Israel-Turkey-Iran-Saudi Arabia need to mend their fences. Please note some points to consider:
1. Turkey is, and will remain, a key connector between the Europe and West Asia and it retains the potential to emerge a pillar of regional integration with its history of multiculturalism and cohabitation in Ottoman times and its core democratic, secular values during its Republican history. A sticking point is over leadership of the Muslim—which it competes for with Saudi Arabia and Iran. This is certainly not new. Questions of temporal legitimacy have preoccupied Islamic governance since the 8th century. However, this needs to be reconciled for integration to work. Turkey does have a stake and an interest in a Grand Bargain.
2. Likewise the Arabian Peninsula — on which Saudi Arabia is, by far, the most robust power — is historically, geographically and ontologically a bridge between Africa and Asia. Despite tensions and an ongoing civil war (Yemen) the states all share the idea of regional stability. With resources unfairly distributed, arable land sparse, domestic populations rapidly growing and the centrepiece of global Islam Riyadh and its Peninsular allies must continue the Islamic renaissance and redefine their relationship to religion and politics. The rest of the Muslim Middle East will likely follow suit.
3. Israel is, again, an exception and is only now emerging as a partner for regional integration. In part this is due to its unique model of democratic stability and ethnic diversity coupled with a back-to-the-wall ideology that forced it to put security first. It now enjoys significant military primacy. For Israel, striking a Grand Bargain and building on the recent normalisation wave is key to its long-term survival as the Arab states demographically dwarf it.
4. The wildcard in this equation is Iran. It remains guesswork to understand the direction the Islamic Republic will take but it is clear that it cannot be neglected. If it continues to spread its revolutionary ideas, the Grand Bargain may just have to wait.
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What steps could be undertaken to jumpstart security and economic integration in West Asia?
First, just like the Treaty of Rome followed the Ventotene Manifesto on Europe, West Asian integration requires a social consensus, vocal intellectual leaders and a set of regional conferences on economic and security cooperation. These meetings could address the steps needed for a common market and common resources similar to the European Coal and Steel Community in post-WWII Europe. Security conferences would follow on, for instance, the model of the Helsinki Conference, which created the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Second could be the launch of a comprehensive economic and security platform (formalising the relationships) between all the regional powers — big and small — on the Israel-UAE model. The two areas should be soldered together. As Kupchan argued, diplomatic engagement with rivals, far from being appeasement, is critical to rapprochement between adversaries. Diplomacy, besides economic interdependence, is the currency of peace: strategic concessions promote mutual trust, necessary to build a prosperous society. But such a process will not be possible without external support, facilitating the diplomatic efforts.
Third, should be the inclusion of key external powers. The UN, the OIC, EU, ASEAN could join the US and NATO and act as guarantors of the process. The EU is crucial here since it is a model worth replicating.
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Diplomacy demands time and patience. At present, it may seem utopian to truly consider West Asian integration, but the European Economic Community also seemed impossible until it was no longer. It was borne of war and the Treaty of Rome — more than 60 years ago — was signed‘to make war [in Europe] not only unthinkable but materially impossible.’ The same could happen in West Asia. But for that to happen, the regional powers will have to lead—intellectually. As the spate of proxy wars end or freeze into stalemates, regional leaders will face a fundamental decision of choosing between the old-style balance of power with all the risks of instability and escalation or a gradual regional integration. The second choice is the only viable option.
Notes
[1] - Richard Haas, The New Thirty Years’ War, Project Syndicate July 21, 2014.
[2] - Lebanon, Israel agree framework for talks to end border dispute, Al Jazeera, October 1, 2020 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/1/lebanon-israel-agree-framework-for-talks-to-end-border-dispute
[3] - Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, Princeton University Press, 2010.