Welcome!
This resource guide will provide a brief overview about the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and our program in Vienna, Austria
On July 7, 2017 – following a decade of advocacy by ICAN and its partners – an overwhelming majority of the world’s nations adopted a landmark global agreement to ban nuclear weapons, known officially as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It entered into force on January 22, 2021.
Article 1: Prohibitions
Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: (a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; (c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly; (d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty; (f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty; (g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
Article 4: Towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
Each State Party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear- weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall cooperate with the competent international authority designated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article for the purpose of verifying the irreversible elimination of its nuclear-weapon programme. The competent international authority shall report to the States Parties. Such a State Party shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.
Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), each State Party that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices shall immediately remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party’s nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. The State Party, no later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, shall submit this plan to the States Parties or to a competent international authority designated by the States Parties. The plan shall then be negotiated with the competent international authority, which shall submit it to the subsequent meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval in accordance with its rules of procedure.
Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), each State Party that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices shall immediately remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party’s nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. The State Party, no later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, shall submit this plan to the States Parties or to a competent international authority designated by the States Parties. The plan shall then be negotiated with the competent international authority, which shall submit it to the subsequent meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval in accordance with its rules of procedure.
A State Party to which paragraph 2 above applies shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence no later than the date upon which implementation of the plan referred to in paragraph 2 is completed. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months after the date of initiation of negotiations. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. Following the entry into force of the agreement referred to in this paragraph, the State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a final declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.
Notwithstanding Article 1 (b) and (g), each State Party that has any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State shall ensure the prompt removal of such weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties. Upon the removal of such weapons or other explosive devices, that State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.
Each State Party to which this Article applies shall submit a report to each meeting of States Parties and each review conference on the progress made towards the implementation of its obligations under this Article, until such time as they are fulfilled.
Article 4: Competent International Authority
The States Parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear- weapons-related facilities in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. In the event that such a designation has not been made prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for a State Party to which paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article applies, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an extraordinary meeting of States Parties to take any decisions that may be required.
Articles 6 and 7: Positive Obligations
Article 6: Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation
Each State Party shall, with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion.
Each State Party, with respect to areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated.
The obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be without prejudice to the duties and obligations of any other States under international law or bilateral agreements.
Article 7: International Cooperation and Assistance
Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty.
In fulfilling its obligations under this Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties.
Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by nuclear-weapons use or testing, to further the implementation of this Treaty.
Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Assistance under this Article may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or on a bilateral basis.
Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have under international law, a State Party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance to affected States Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.
Reactions by NWS and their Allies: "Protest Press Conference" in 2017
Ambassador Haley questioned whether countries favoring a weapons ban understood the nature of global threats. Referring to nations participating in the talks, she said, “You have to ask yourself, are they looking out for their people? She continued, "As a mom, as a daughter, there is nothing I want more for my family than a world with no nuclear weapons, but we have to be realistic. “Is there anyone that believes that North Korea would agree to a ban on nuclear weapons? So what you would see is the General Assembly would go through in good faith trying to do something, but North Korea would be the one cheering, and all of us and the people we represent would be the ones at risk."
Additional Information: Positions of the Nuclear Armed States
- United States of America
- In December 2021, the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, said: “We do not support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Seeking to ban nuclear weapons through a treaty that does not include any of the countries that actually possess nuclear weapons is not likely to produce any results.”
- Along with other nuclear-armed states, the United States has said that it does “not accept any claim that [the TPNW] contributes to the development of customary international law”. It has called on all states that are considering supporting the TPNW “to reflect seriously on its implications for international peace and security”.
- In October 2020 – with the TPNW’s entry into force imminent – the United States called on states that had already ratified the treaty to withdraw their support. However, in September 2021, the US undersecretary for arms control and international security, Bonnie Jenkins, said that the United States is no longer “telling countries that they shouldn’t sign” the TPNW.
- United Kingdom
- The United Kingdom has consistently voted against an annual UN General Assembly resolution since 2018 that welcomes the adoption of the TPNW and calls upon all states to sign, ratify, or accede to it “at the earliest possible date”.
- Along with other nuclear-armed states, the United Kingdom has said that it does “not accept any claim that [the TPNW] contributes to the development of customary international law”. It has called on all states that are considering supporting the the treaty “to reflect seriously on its implications for international peace and security”.
- France
- France has consistently voted against an annual UN General Assembly resolution since 2018 that welcomes the adoption of the TPNW and calls upon all states to sign, ratify, or accede to it “at the earliest possible date”.
- Along with other nuclear-armed states, France has said that it does “not accept any claim that [the TPNW] contributes to the development of customary international law”. It has called on all states that are considering supporting the the TPNW “to reflect seriously on its implications for international peace and security”.
- In 2018, the foreign affairs committee of the French national assembly recommended that the government “mitigate its criticism” of the TPNW “to show that we understand and take into account the concerns of states and their desire for more balanced global governance”.
- It actively discouraged other states, in particular its former colonies, from supporting the resolution.
- Russia
- The minister for foreign affairs of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, said in 2019 that the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons cannot be achieved “by the unilateral and rather arrogant methods on which this document [the TPNW] is based."
- China
- In October 2020, with the TPNW’s entry into force imminent, China said that it “has always been advocating complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, which is fundamentally in line with purposes of TPNW."
- North Korea
- North Korea has voted against an annual UN General Assembly resolution in since 2020 that welcomes the adoption of the TPNW and calls upon all states to sign, ratify, or accede to it “at the earliest possible date”. In 2018 and 2019, it abstained from voting on the same resolution.
- India
- India has consistently voted against an annual UN General Assembly resolution since 2018 that welcomes the adoption of the TPNW and calls upon all states to sign, ratify, or accede to it “at the earliest possible date”.
- Pakistan
- Pakistan has consistently voted against an annual UN General Assembly resolution since 2018 that welcomes the adoption of the TPNW and calls upon all states to sign, ratify, or accede to it “at the earliest possible date”.'
- Israel
- Israel has consistently voted against an annual UN General Assembly resolution since 2018 that welcomes the adoption of the TPNW and calls upon all states to sign, ratify, or accede to it “at the earliest possible date”.
- In 2021, it said that it has “deep reservations regarding this initiative ... based on substantive as well as procedural considerations” and emphasised that the TPNW’s entry into force “is relevant only to those countries who signed or ratified it, hence Israel is not obliged by it in any way”.
TPNW entered into force on January 22, 2021
Announcement: 1MSP in Vienna
July 19, 2022 to July 21, 2022 in Vienna, Austria
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on January 22, 2021. Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Treaty specifies that "the first meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary- General of the United Nations within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty."
Originally scheduled to be held in January 2022, States Parties subsequently decided to hold the Meeting from March 22-24, 2022 at the United Nations Office at Vienna.
On January 31, 2022, the States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons "decid[ed] to postpone the Meeting of States Parties from March 22-24 2022 and to retain the tentative reservation for the dates of July 19-22 2022 at the United Nations Office of Vienna to ensure dates remain available; authoriz[ed] the President-designate and the Secretariat to continue to explore alternatives; request[ed] the President-designate and the Secretariat to report on any alternative options, including on their cost implications and the necessary logistical arrangements, no later than February 28, 2022; [and] reaffirm[ed] that their priority remains the holding of an inclusive Meeting of States Parties, preferably at a United Nations venue." Source: https://meetings.unoda.org/meeting/tpnw-msp-1-2022/
Which states have confirmed their attendance as observers?
Policy and Advocacy Projects
- Youth Dialogues with Diplomats/Officials Every Thursday at 4pm EST
- Policy and Advocacy Work will be based on the thematic papers by the facilitators
- Session 1: Feb. 26 Review of Papers by the facilitators
- Session 2: March 5 First Draft of the RTT White Paper
- Session 3: March 12 Second Draft of the RTT White Paper
- Session 4: March 19 Sharing the RTT White Paper with Experts for feedback
- Session 5: End of March/Early April Online Event to Share Youth Perspectives on the TPNW
- Optional: Prepare a paper for the RTT Journal, Deadline: End of March
- Special Sessions with Experts
- 1. International Humanitarian Law and the TPNW
- 2. Examining Nuclear Disarmament through a Gender Lens
- 3. Nuclear Colonialism: Legacy of Nuclear Weapons amongst Pacific and Indigenous Peoples
- 4. African Americans against the Bomb
- 5. Climate and Nuclear Weapons
- 6. Pre-Orientation and Run-through of Schedule
Schedule for Vienna, Austria: Forthcoming
OUR PARTICIPANTS
Coordinators: Christian N. Ciobanu, Danielle Samler, Lovely Umayam
Policy and Advocacy Team:
Akemi Terukina, Kenneth Chiu, Sarah Rohleder, Jed Peterson, Mathilde Haas, Alei Rizvi, Casey Richardson and Suryakiran Nallapati
Social Media Team:
Monalisa Hazarika, Shoshanna Hemley and Marcina Langrine
Peer to Peer Education:
Molly Hurley and Emma Pike
Logistics:
Emma Locker
Events Organizing Team:
Marisha Jones and Rooj Ali
- Cost of Flights:
- Suva to Vienna - $1,861.45 (x3) Total : $5,584.35
- Vanuatu to Fiji to Vienna - $285 + $1861.45 (x2) Total : $4292.9
- New Delhi to Vienna - $583 (x1)
- Springdale to Vienna (via Boston) - $1307 (x2) Total : $2614
- California to Vienna - $706.9
- Visa - $90.74 (x6) Total : $544.44
ACCOMMODATIONS
Options for accommodations: A&o Wien Hauptbahnhof, ÖJAB-Europahaus Dr. Bruno Buchwieser, or renting group airbnbs. More information is forthcoming.
Annex A. Relevant Information about the TPNW
Watch 'If You Love This Planet', a beautifully animated short film, which brings to life Hiroshima survivor Setsuko Thurlow’s passionate call to action, on the day that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted at the United Nations
Websites:
Further Readings:
John Borrie (2021) An Introduction to Implementing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament. 4:1, 1-12, DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.1947460
Bonnie Docherty (2018) Understanding Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation Under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Human Rights @ Harvard Law
Bonnie Docherty (2020) From Obligation to Action: Advancing Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 3:2, 253-264, DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2020.1842657
Bonnie Docherty ( 2021) A Singular Opportunity: Setting Standards for Victim Assistance under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Global Policy Journal, DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12927
Elizabeth Minor (2021) Addressing Nuclear Harm: Prioritization for the First Meeting of the State Parties of the TPNW, Article36
Matthew Bolton (2018) The ‘-Pacific’ part of ‘Asia-Pacific’: Oceanic diplomacy in the 2017 treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, Asian Journal of Political Science, 26:3, 371-389, DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2018.1515641
Moritz Kütt & Zia Mian (2019) "Setting the Deadline for Nuclear Weapon Destruction under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons," Journal of Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2019.1674471
Zia Mian, "Taking the nuclear ban treaty forward," Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, Published October 30, 2020, Link: https://thebulletin.org/2020/10/taking-the-nuclear-ban-treaty-forward/
Additional Resources:
Ambassador Teburoro Tito & Christian Ciobanu, "Tavita i vs. Koriate iaon te Boom Ae Mwakaroiroi", Outrider, Published on February 16, 2022
Togzhan Kassenova, "How Kazakhstan Fought Back Against Soviet Nuclear Tests", Carnegie Endowment
Susanne Bauera, Boris Gusevb, Tatyana Belikhinab, Timur Moldagalievbc & Kazbek Apsalikovb "The Legacies of Soviet Nuclear Testing in Kazakhstan: Fallout, Public Health and Societal Issues", Science Direct, Published on September 9, 2013