Learn about the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance:

What it is, how it works and how civil society can use it

1. A quick glance at the continental governance agenda
2. What is the ACDEG?
3. What it covers and what it is missing
4. What drives the adoption of the Charter?
5. Can the Charter lead to better governance on the ground, and how can civil society help?

In the 15 years of the Charter's existence, Africa has seen highs and lows in the area of governance.

3) What it covers and what it is missing

The full text of the ACDEG is a dense, 20 pages long legal document stressing the responsibilities of different parties – especially states and the African Union’s Commission.

It has thematic chapters that introduce principles, a few broad areas of governance issues, and mechanisms for implementation. With a closer look, the Charter covers in fact a few more themes than just those headings – further themes are dispersed throughout the text. Here is an overview of all it addresses, with examples.

The Charter addresses the different interrelated components of democracy, human rights and governance. There is an explicit focus on a few areas where good governance is most manifest as a good, which states need to deliver, starting with the quality of elections and respect for political rights of citizens. Other aspects such as the rule of law are societal goals which states, but also citizens, organisations and the private sector need to contribute towards. At the very centre stands the commitment to constitutional order, which opposes all forms of military coups and revolutions. This concern is raised prominently in the preamble of the Charter, and it reflects the nature of the document as one adopted by governments conscious of their own vulnerability against the trend of power grabs on the continent.

The ACDEG is not just a legal commitment but it’s also a statement about the thinking of African states at the time of writing. It touches on why and how governance should be promoted. Good governance is promoted insofar as it serves wider socio-economic development and as a way of preventing conflict. Roles are assigned to the African Union, some of its organs, member states as well as Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

Certainly the most crucial omission – but a forgivable one since the document was drafted in the early 2000s – is the place of digital technologies in governance dynamics. It is estimated that in the fifteen years that have passed since the adoption of the ACDEG, the percentage of citizens in Subsaharan Africa who have access to the internet increased almost tenfold, from 3.5% to roughly 30%.

The use of technology by citizens, civil society organisations and governments on the continent has had significant effects on electoral processes in the past two decades. For instance, governments’ reactionary approach through internet shutdown, introducing social media tax and targeting online activists in some of the countries reflects infringement on freedom of expression and participation. Likewise, the misuse of digital technologies by political agents to manipulate and weaponise facts affects people’s trust in institutions and in each other. Social media platforms have leveraged the rise in misinformation and disinformation resulting in engineered elections and insecurity.

But the ACDEG lacks any concrete measures pertaining to safeguarding citizens' online participation, any related regulatory framework, and it has yet to provide responsibilities for member states towards the use of emerging technologies in enforcing democratisation. Much as it encourages the development and utilisation of ICT under Article 27, it does not go so far as to encompass digital governance, online safety, freedom of digital expression and cyber-security. National governments and the AU are, however, increasingly coming up with policies on the various facets of digital governance

When it comes to digital technologies, addressing the missing links can mean a focus on civic participation, hate speech and disinformation, as well as internet shutdowns, orchestrated fake news campaigns and commercial trolls. Non-discrimination of marginalised groups and women's needs to take into account the digital divide which sees many inequalities exacerbated by difficulties to access technologies available to other groups. Trust in the accountability and integrity of elected officials, polling results and state efforts at promoting economic activity all require serious efforts at providing transparent data that can be checked in real-time, or close enough, and which activists can disprove or confirm by providing crowdsourced and/or leaked digital information.

Another area where the international landscape has changed substantially since the mid-2000s is that of environmental sustainability. The world is now collectively much more aware of the multifaceted realities of climate change and of existential environmental degradation. This is not entirely a blind spot for the Charter: its article 42 simply defers to the relevant treaties covering environmental protection to achieve sustainable development, without further precisions. However this is rather slim in light of the current evidence of climate-fueled conflicts (e.g. in the Sahel) and the need for long term vision of leaders to secure public goods.

These oversights are understandable considering the different context in which the ACDEG was debated and adopted. Also, they do not sentence the Charter to irrelevance, far from it: it is simply important to be aware of the gaps and compensate for what is missing when turning it into practice.

Besides, amending a legally binding and already enforceable treaty is a cumbersome exercise. Hence there seems to be little prospect of an update in the short or mid-term, and the key question remains what states make of the Charter as it is.

In practical terms, member states themselves have the responsibility to enforce the ACDEG, but continental structures also have roles to play. The AU has set up a whole system to promote the implementation of the Charter and related commitments. We have mentioned the roles of the PSC, courts and the APRM, but in fact a whole array of structures are part of the African Governance Architecture. Here is an overview of the distribution of labour as per the Charter (bearing in mind that some adjustments are in effect since additional documents complemented it – see below).

4) What drives the adoption of the Charter?

The ratification of the Charter has been a somewhat slow process, deemed disappointing by many. Still, over the years a majority of African countries have ratified it (34 today). In light of the ambition of making it a legally binding agenda it was anticipated that states will be reluctant to sign on to its terms; that it came into force to begin with, should not be taken for granted.

The initial design and adoption of the Charter was the result of a specific time. Not unrelated to the era of democratisation of the 1990s at the global level, and the mix of fears of instability and normative optimism that surrounded (and enabled) the creation of the African Union at the turn of the millennium, a flourish of declarations and commitments to improved governance had been adopted under the auspices of the AU. They can be visualised on the top of the below infographic.

Hence the top-left side of the visual, which lists commitments added over the period 2008-2021, has significantly fewer entries than the bottom-left one which covers mostly the early 2000s. With the main building blocks in place – the ACDEG and its counterpart on human rights, the ACHPR – and the institutional framework set in place, the subsequent documents are for the most part about fine-tuning and elaborating the ACDEG’s commitments in specific areas such as public service principles or decentralisation. Meanwhile, documents to operationalise the governance agenda at a regional level under the auspices of RECs were progressively developed (right).

This goes to show some of the bureaucratic logic of the ACDEG’s adoption. But what of the political motivations? In fact, from the onset it may seem strange to set specific rules of governance in a legally binding treaty. After all, politics is a messy business everywhere and each country has its own way of handling it, mostly in ways that differ from the tenets of so-called 'good' governance. What’s more, many issues can only be arbitrated by the popular judgement of voters or protesters, or by courts, and not simply by applying neutrally the stipulations of an international treaty.

Hence, there are bound to be constant challenges and legitimate claims of breaches of the Charter. So, why do countries adopt a treaty that they know they will violate to some extent, or that can be used against them?

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly why some countries adopt the Charter while others did not, but the desire to end coups and conflicts that had overtaken different regions of the continent in the 90s, pan African political ambitions of the time, who was in government at the time, the ability and interest of civil society to mobilise on this issue, and the global context, continue to play a role in shaping which countries ratify the Charter and why. International powers – especially through their ability to provide funding, whether they are traditional donors or influential non-democracies – and civil society may play a role in putting or deflecting pressure for adoption.

Worldwide, phases of democratisation and autocratisation alternate and can reflect into different country priorities to some extent. But a study finds no overall clear and direct link between governance performance and adoption status. This is confirmed by a rapid examination of country cases: Cameroon, Chad, Rwanda and Guinea-Bissau were among the early adopters, not to mention the first two countries to ratify – Ethiopia and Mauritania. None of these were very democratic at the time of signing, while on the other hand a country hailed by some as being democratic, Botswana, has not yet signed or ratified the ACDEG.

Status of ratification

Why have twelve states signed but not ratified? The situations vary from country to country, ranging from a lack of interest (in light of other pressing priorities) to the absence of adequate ratification procedures in some countries’ political systems, often in contexts of limited resources and capacity for conducting the process, as well as coordination issues.

Indeed, adopting the Charter “typically requires – after commitment from the highest authorities – all key government and non-governmental stakeholders to work together during this process.” Reportedly, part of the slow progress stems from a degree of nonchalance combined with the occasional technical hurdles, rather than from active resistance and decision not to adopt the Charter.

In theory, one of the reasons not to adopt the Charter is the fact that it can be used against governments that conduct breaches of constitutional orders, for instance when their leaders try to stay in power beyond their term limits. However it is not clear that this plays a decisive role in practice. What is more, by committing countries to constitutional order, the Charter also provides a safeguard (at least morally) against attempts to oust governments illegally. Further inquiry about specific countries is still needed to get a clearer picture of the reasons underlying adoption and non-adoption.

It is all well and good to examine what might drive or deter the legal adoption of the Charter, but like for just any legal commitment, what matters at the end of the day is its implementation: the record of countries and societies on governance.

5) Can the Charter lead to better governance on the ground, and how can civil society help?

At first glance, enduring governance, democratic and human rights related issues across the continent seem to indicate that the ACDEG is not working well. There are some concerns about the performance of many African countries when it comes to governance: they follow the wider trend in the world, of increased polarisation and relative democratic recession.

In fact, there are concerns that African autocracies are trying to undermine the governance agenda, though ignoring it may be enough to grind it to a halt. Responding to growing concerns around the resurgence of armed conflicts and its commitment to silence the guns (originally by 2020), the AU is updating its governance approach in ways that may make it more appealing. Indeed, governance is increasingly understood as ex ante conflict prevention, and the merger between AU Commission structures into a joint political affairs, peace and security department may accompany the movement.

With this little caveat, there is overall limited appetite for the continental level to play a larger role in African countries’ governance. There is also scepticism about the ability of international and continental treaties to achieve much, when outcomes on the ground are usually decided by the integrity - or lack thereof - of leaders, the ability of protesters and voters to mobilise, and technologies to foster citizen engagement, spread disinformation or manipulate electoral processes. That is: the most impactful drivers of governance are at the national level.

So the ability of the ACDEG to influence outcomes on the ground is itself a subject of controversy. In a few cases, for instance in Madagascar and Burkina Faso, it was found to have had a small but real impact on the way political processes were conducted. Activists and politicians have used the Charter as a source of authority, for instance to decide who might be able to run in transition elections after a coup, and to legitimise the overthrow of a president who breached constitutional order by extending his mandate beyond its legal duration.

Ultimately, there is no way to tell how things would have gone in country X or Y should there have been no Charter. So perhaps the better question is: what can be done to ensure that the stipulations of the Charter are better enforced, and how can one contribute to this?

This guide to the ACDEG was prepared by Martin Ronceray and Isabell Wutz, with the help of Lidet Tadesse, Philomena Apiko, Bruce Byiers, Robert Okello and Maelle Salzinger. All the visuals have been prepared by Yaseena van ‘t Hoff. For information about this guide please contact Martin Ronceray at mro@ecdpm.org. To learn more about ECDPM’s work on African institutions and regional dynamics, visit this page. To learn more about the Charter Project Africa, visit this page.